Production Sharing Contract (PSC), Buyback Contract (BBC) and Iran Petroleum Contract (IPC) are considered as three rival Contracts in upstream oil & gas field in Iran. So, decision makers in the process of selecting a suitable Contract from the set of three mentioned Contracts consider a set of jurisprudential, legal and economic conditions about these Contracts. In this paper with the aim of explaining the economic capacity of the three Contracts in comparision with each other and based on Static Optimal Methods, we compare these contacts in terms of two important economic indices of optimal investment and oil Production and then, we prioritize them. Finally, we have concluded that upstream Contracts of Production Sharing, Iran Petroleum Contract and Buyback are ranked in the first, the second and the third place from the perspective of optimal investment level, and from the perspective of optimal oil Production level, in case of more participation of private sector and less interference of public ector, these Contracts are ranked the first, the second and the third, respectively.

Signing Oil Contracts with international oil companies for upstream and downstream operations in Iran's oil industry has a long history. After the discovery of oil, the first international oil Contract was signed in Iran. Different types of oil Contracts have been used in Iran. In most cases, the adequacy of Contracts in terms of economic benefits has raised questions and ambiguities for Iran. To investigate this topic, the gas buyback Contracts are evaluated from an economic point of view. In order to assess the results more carefully, these Contracts are compared with the Production Sharing Contracts. Phases 2 and 3, and also 4 and 5 of South Pars Gas Field have been selected for this paper. Since these projects have been awarded in the form of buy-back Contract, in addition of defining different scenarios, the Production Sharing Contract for the project has been simulated. After finding the best scenario in terms of the Production Sharing Contracts for both projects, we found that for phases 2 and 3 of the South Pars, the Production Sharing Contract and for phases 4 and 5, the buyback Contract, are proved to be more favorable for Iran.

A survey of the variety of Contractual systems in the oil industry shows that countries across the world use different exploration and development Contracts in their oil fields. However, oil and gas industry is covered with three Contractual systems (Concession, Product Sharing Contracts (PSC) and Service Contracts) and exploration and exploitation activities of projects are assigned by these systems. This notwithstanding, if we review the Contract items and elements, we can understand a wide variety of Contractual systems. Based on this analysis and evidence, projects with same conditions may have different fiscal regimes. Therefore, with this interpretation, financial, technical and legal issues are significant factors in Contractual system. Based on Contract's name, an impartial judgment could not be made. In this article, fiscal regime in product Sharing agreements are explained and analyzed. Thereafter, it is shown how threshold and trigger effect the government and investors take. Finally, fiscal regime factors and their influence on oil and gas project return will be explained.

Identifying the constraining factors of Production and yield gap is very important. Therefore; this research was performed to identify the Production constraining factors of local rice cultivars. All management practices from nursery preparation to harvesting stages for 100 paddy fields of local rice cultivars were recorded through field studies, in Sari, from 2015-2016. In the CPA, the actual and calculated potential yield were 4495 and 5703 kg/ha, respectively and the gap was 1221 kg/ha. The yield gap caused by number of top-dressing variables was 324 kg/ha, equal to 27% of the total yield gap. The yield gap related to previous year of legumes cultivation was 218 kg ha-1, equal to 18% of the total yield variation. Among the 10 variables entered in the CPA model, the effects of top-dress fertilizer application and its application frequency and foliar application were remarkable, which could compensate a significant part of the yield gap (444 kg/ha, 37% of total) in the farmers’ fields by managing these variables. According to boundary line analysis (BLA) finding, actual yield mean on the basis of optimal limit related to 12 variables under study was 5369 kg/ha, with 881 kg/ha yield gap . Mean relative yield and relative yield gap for 12 variables (transplanting date, seedling age, number of seedlings per hill, planting density, nitrogen and phosphorous per hectare, nitrogen before transplanting, harvesting date, lodging problem, pest problem, diseases problem and weeds problem) were 83.64 and 16.35 kg/ha, respectively. Based on the finding, it can be stated that the model precision is appropriate and can be applied for both estimation of the quantity of yield gap and determining the portion of each restricting yield variables.

The choice of financial regime in oil-rich countries depends on proven reserves, exploration and Production costs, geological characteristics, political risks, and oil market conditions. In this article, Contractual components of three Contracts IPC, BUYBACK, and PSC are introduced using Visual Basic programming language, and a model structure for a 42-season period scenar-io with oil prices is created. Also, modeling based on the parameters of the Shadegan oil field is another innovation of this work. The aim of this research is to investigate the effective indica-tors in the oil and gas industry Contracts based on oil price scenarios. The results of this study show that many of the constraints of the reservoir owner country have been modified in the direction of protecting oil fields and effectively controlling Contractor's fees in modified mutual agreement and Production Sharing Contracts, and the financial system of the new oil Contracts is more efficient in case of an oil price increase and in the final years of Production compared to Production Sharing and buyback Contracts. In this study, comparing indicators such as internal rate of return, payback period, profitability index, and the share of both parties in the Contract based on real and simulated data showed that entering into new oil Contracts in Iran, especially IPC in the Shadegan oil field, can protect the oil field, prevent uncontrolled oil extraction, and control Contractor's revenues, leading to lower costs and higher revenues compared to buyback and Production Sharing Contracts for the host country (Iran).

This study proposes a novel option-revenue Sharing coordination Contract framework. In the proposed model, the retailer determines the number of order sales effort. The manufacturer sets the price of products for the wholesale strategy. The investigated supply chain problem analyzes the results of different strategies. In the proposed coordination Contract problem, two types of games including retailer-based game and manufacturer-based Stackelberg game are considered. In both cases the retailer adopts the value of order and the sales effort and the manufacturer determines the wholesale price. To assess the performance of the proposed Contract, a wholesale and a basic selection Contract are considered in the model. To obtain the Nash equilibrium in the retailer-based state of the proposed option-revenue Sharing coordination Contract problem, a hybrid algorithm consisting of a heuristic and a genetic algorithm is proposed by considering the computational complexities of the proposed model. A numerical comparison between the proposed Contract and other cases demonstrates that the option-revenue Sharing Contract significantly dominates the basic option and the wholesale price Contract. Finally, we implemented some numerical experiments on the critical parameters of the Contract. Based on the results, increasing the price-dependency of demand results in less number of products ordered by the retailer.

Contract of Istesna’ is not new a Contract. It has been long discussed by great juristic scholars dealing with its rulings. Sheykh Tusi in Al-Khelaf and Al-Mabsoot, Shafe’ei in Al-Umm and Sarakhsi in Al-mabsoot have discussed about Istesna’and it’s licit or illicit position, although in the past its applications were limited to instances such as orders for making boots, shoes and iron, zinc or wood utensils.In this paper, after explaining the meaning of Istesna’, this Contract has been recognized as an independent one. Then, after introducing Istesna’securities, jurisprudential and legal issues on the matter and on the relations in trading stock, bonds and institutions in relation with issues of Contract of Istesna’ and jurisprudence of selling have been studied. It has been tried to suggest solutions for challenges in the relevant field.

One of the challenging issues in the Iranian petroleum industry over the past decades has been the issue of applying Contractual method of Production Sharing for the development of hydrocarbon fields. In fact, the interpretation made by a number of directors and policymakers in the field of oil industry that application of Production Sharing Contract is unlawful due to conflict with Article 45 of the constitution, has become an obstacle to the evolution of oil Contracts in Iran, which even after approval of Petroleum Ministry Act in 2012 authorizing the application of participatory Contractual methods in the upstream sector, virtually no change has occurred so far. In article 45 of the Constitution, oil resources are not mentioned in the category of Anfal, but from the jurisprudential and constitutional point of views, oil resources are considered as mines (Anfal). It is important to note that the Mines Act has authorized concessionary model for the exploitation of mines. Therefore, it is argued that when, from the perspective of the Constitution, mines and oil resources both are considered as Anfal, why the legislator has allowed the use of concessionary method for exploitation of mines while application of the Production Sharing method in the oil industry, which is far better than the concessionary model in terms of public interest, is in contradiction with Article 45? A careful examination of the theoretical and legal bases for the exploitation of oil and mineral resources suggests that, contrary to what is being interpreted, the common legal basis between mineral resources and oil resources, that is to say, both being regarded as Anfal, implies the logical consequence that when using the concessionary method for exploitation of mines is permissible, the use of the Production Sharing method in oil industry is legally much more permissible. It is noteworthy that the analytical approach adopted in this research is based on library studies.

Due to the globalization of markets and the advancements in communications, such as the Internet and e-commerce, consumers are directly linked to manufacturers. Consumers can search a product in an offline store, and then they buy it in an online store. This paper investigates the influence of channel synchronization on the supplier, the retailer and the entire supply chain in the dual-channel supply chains. Contracts are valuable tools used in both theory and practice to coordinate various supply chains among synchronization mechanisms. This study presents a hybrid model with a new demand function and surveys the effects of free riding on sales effort in a dual-channel supply chain comprising of one manufacturer and one offline store. To achieve beneficial outcomes, this paper considers a cost-Sharing Contract to synchronize a dual-channel supply chain. Finally, we focus on the expansion of the model in the stochastic demand solved by the genetic algorithm.